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Too Heavy a Burden:  Testing Complicity-Based Claims 
Under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
KALEB BROOKS* 
INTRODUCTION 
 In “a decision of startling breadth,”1 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 
announced a significant expansion of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act’s 
(RFRA) protections to encompass so-called “complicity-based compliance claims.”2 
Consider the plaintiffs’ basic claim in the now famous case: Hobby Lobby and the 
other corporate plaintiffs claimed that compliance with the Affordable Care Act’s 
(ACA) minimum coverage requirements would substantially burden their religious 
exercise because it would require them to provide contraceptive coverage. In their 
view, this coverage was objectionable because some employees might independently 
select certain pharmaceuticals that might cause some fertilized zygotes to fail to 
adhere to uterine walls.3 On account of this uncertain causal chain, the Hobby Lobby 
plaintiffs claimed that compliance with the law would force them to “facilitate” 
abortion, a prospect they viewed as grave sin.4 The Supreme Court, by a narrow 
majority, validated this view, proclaiming that the plaintiffs were entitled to “draw a 
line” regarding their willingness to participate in the sins of others because the 
Judiciary is ill-equipped to question the reasonableness of such complex moral and 
ethical questions.5 
Accordingly, Hobby Lobby stands for the proposition that RFRA applies strict 
scrutiny not only to legislative enactments that directly impinge on adherents’ 
religious conduct but also to laws that direct otherwise nonreligious activity through 
which adherents fear complicity in the sins of others.6 Some commentators have 
noted that this expansion of RFRA analysis to include complicity-based claims has 
the potential to stand as the case’s most influential holding,7 but at present, the 
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 1.  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2787 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 2.  See Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based 
Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2518–19 (2015). 
 3.  See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Amy J. 
Sepinwall, Conscience and Complicity: Assessing Pleas for Religious Exemptions in Hobby 
Lobby’s Wake, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1897, 1899 (2015) (“The understanding of complicity 
underpinning this claim is vastly more expansive than that which standard legal doctrine or 
moral theory contemplates.”). 
 4.  See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764–65. 
 5.  Id. at 2778 (citing Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 
(1981)). 
 6.  See Nejaime & Siegel, supra note 2, at 2519. 
 7.  See Sepinwall, supra note 3, at 1905 (arguing that “Hobby Lobby’s deeper 
significance” and “the ‘parade of horribles’ it threatens” do not arise from the “corporate law 
implications of the decision” but rather with the Court’s expansive view of complicity wherein 
exemptions are warranted just “so long as the religious adherent believes himself to be 
implicated in the conduct that his religion opposes”); see also Nejaime & Siegel, supra note 
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precise breadth of potentially-viable complicity claims under Hobby Lobby remains 
uncertain.  
Perhaps in an attempt to add clarity to this field, the Supreme Court, in November 
2015, granted certiorari in another complicity-based RFRA challenge to the ACA; 
specifically, the Court granted review to determine whether “the availability of a 
regulatory method for nonprofit religious employers to comply with [Health and 
Human Services’] contraceptive mandate eliminate[s] either the substantial burden 
on religious exercise or the violation of RFRA that this Court recognized in Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.”8 But, by the time the Zubik case ripened for decision, a 
key member of the Burwell conservative majority, Justice Scalia, had passed away.9 
With his vacancy unfilled, it appeared that the Court, bitterly divided in Hobby 
Lobby, was unable to reach a majority opinion with regard to whether plaintiffs’ 
complicity claims articulated a significant burden under RFRA.10 Instead, following 
a round of supplemental briefing, the Court remanded the combined Zubik cases to 
their respective circuits with instructions directing a compromise solution.11 Because 
the Zubik court failed to reach of the merits of the case before it, the core question 
regarding how lower courts ought to consider complicity-based RFRA claims 
remains unanswered. 
This Note focuses upon this question in order to more broadly analyze the 
emerging frontier of complicity-based conscience claims. Specifically, this Note 
analyzes a sample of the federal circuit court decisions that considered 
complicity-based challenges to the ACA’s accommodation scheme during the period 
between Hobby Lobby and the Court’s granting certiorari in Zubik; this survey 
concludes that the various judicial approaches developed since Hobby Lobby may be 
categorized according to their adherence to three primary modes of argument. After 
finding that this array of judicially-created tests largely misunderstands the structure 
of complicity-based arguments, I contend that courts should determine the 
substantiality of complicity claims under the Act according to whether compliance 
with a law requires direct participation in apparently sinful conduct or mere religious 
unease with the actions of others.  
In Part I, I locate complicity claims in the larger framework of RFRA litigation 
and posit a general argumentative scheme for understanding and critiquing the 
                                                                                                                 
 
2, at 2542 (relating the expansion of complicity-based claims for exemptions to “long-running 
‘culture-war’ conflicts about laws that break from traditional morality”).  
 8.  Question Presented at ii, Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, No. 
15-105 (U.S Nov. 6, 2015), consolidated with Zubik v. Burwell, No. 14-1418 (U.S. May 16, 
2016) (per curiam).  
 9.  See Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q9LA-L34L]. 
 10.  See Editorial, The Crippled Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/17/opinion/the-crippled-supreme-court.html?comments 
[https://perma.cc/FJP9-KHC8] (commenting that the Zubik opinion “solves nothing” because 
“[e]ven if these plaintiffs can find their way to an agreement with the government that satisfies 
their religious objections, there are other employers with different religious beliefs who will 
not be satisfied, and more lawsuits are sure to follow”). 
 11.  See Zubik, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam) (expressing no opinion on the merits). 
42 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol.92:40 
 
structure of such claims. Broadly, I build upon existing models of complicity-based 
arguments that distill these claims into their basic components and advance a means 
of differentiating the degree of judicial deference each component merits.12 In Part 
II, I provide a brief overview of the statutory and regulatory provisions that make up 
the ACA accommodation scheme for religious, non-profit employers who object to 
the provision of contraceptive services. Then, I categorize fourteen decisions from 
various federal circuit courts13 that considered RFRA challenges to the ACA 
accommodation scheme according to their primary means of testing 
complicity-based claims. In this analysis, I depart from the body of work on 
complicity-based claims that focuses on structure or implications of such claims to 
consider the development of judicial analysis in the field since Hobby Lobby. In Part 
III, I critique these various approaches to the substantiality analysis and briefly 
sketch a judicial test that allows courts to scrutinize complicity-based claims without 
inquiring into the reasonableness of their religious underpinnings. Finally, in the 
conclusion, I turn to the proceedings in Zubik. I conclude that the order remanding 
the matter, when viewed in light of the parties’ supplemental briefs, reveals a deeply 
divided court on the question of complicity under the RFRA. Each of the three 
approaches apparent in the circuit court decisions giving rise to Zubik remain 
potentially viable under the compromise approach the court assumed in its remand 
order. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 12.  In effect, this Note attempts to distill the “field-invariant” structure of complicity-
based arguments in order to uncover the basic argumentative “standards by reference to which 
we assess” the validity of such claims. See STEPHEN E. TOULMIN, THE USES OF ARGUMENT 15 
(2003). The task of mapping a basic structure of argument is especially important for 
complicity claims because these claims span distinctly theological and legal “fields” of 
argument; distinguishing the field-invariant structure of such arguments from their religiously 
dependent content allows a critic to consider the senses in which their “acceptability or 
unacceptability” depends “upon their ‘formal’ merits and defects” without regard to the 
soundness of their religious reasoning. See id. at 88.  
 13.  This Note analyzes fourteen circuit court decisions, concurrences, and dissents that 
addressed the substantiality of asserted burdens in cases seeking injunctions against the 
Department of Health and Human Services regarding the non-profit accommodation scheme 
between the Hobby Lobby decision and November 2015. The analysis includes opinions from 
the following cases: Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Catholic 
Health Care Sys. v. Burwell, 796 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2450 (2016); 
Dordt Coll. v. Burwell, 801 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2006 (2016); Little 
Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2015), vacated, 
136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 801 
F.3d 927 (8th Cir. 2015), vacated, No. 15-775, 2016 WL 2842448 (U.S. May 16, 2016); Grace 
Schs. v. Burwell, 801 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2011 (2016); Mich. 
Catholic Conference & Catholic Family Servs. v. Burwell, 807 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2015), 
vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2450 (2016); E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 793 F.3d 449 (5th Cir. 
2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606 (7th 
Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2007 (2016); Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Priests for Life 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 
1557 (2016); and Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 756 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2014). 
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I. THE STRUCTURE OF COMPLICITY BASED RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CLAIMS 
In a general sense, Congress passed the RFRA to overturn Employment Division 
v. Smith14 and maintain strict scrutiny as the standard of review for laws that place 
burdens on religious practice.15 In relevant part, RFRA states: “Government shall not 
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a 
rule of general applicability,” unless “it demonstrates that application of the burden 
to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is 
the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”16 
Besides making clear an intent to overturn Smith’s holding that the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment “does not relieve an individual of the obligation to 
comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability,”17 the statutory language 
provides little guidance as to the proper standards for adjudication under its strict 
scrutiny regime.18 
It is, however, clear that Congress only intended its strict scrutiny test to apply to 
“substantial” burdens on religious exercise.19 In this sense, the RFRA creates a 
two-step, burden-shifting framework: a plaintiff bears the initial burden to show that 
a law substantially burdens her religious practice, and thereafter the government 
bears the burden to show that the challenged law represents the least restrictive means 
of attaining a compelling governmental interest.20 
To meet the requirement of substantiality, a burden on religious practice must be 
restrictive in two senses: the plaintiff faces a conjunctive burden to show that the law 
compels some religiously forbidden activity and that noncompliance triggers some 
sufficiently serious repercussion.21 If a plaintiff fails to demonstrate both elements of 
substantiality, the burden will be characterized as “de minimis” and the challenged 
law will be subject to rational basis review.22 Parsed in this way, substantiality 
analysis relies in part on determining the amount of coercion the government uses to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 14.  494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 15.  See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 236 (“Congress sought to reinstate as a statutory 
matter the pre-Smith free exercise standard.”). 
 16.  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(a), (b) (2012). 
 17.  494 U.S. at 879 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 18.  See Matthew A. Melone, Corporations and Religious Freedom: Hobby Lobby 
Stores—A Missed Opportunity to Reconcile a Flawed Law with a Flawed Health Care System, 
48 IND. L. REV. 461, 483 (2015) (“RFRA provides neither context nor nuance. In effect, it was 
a vote for religious freedom in a vacuum.”). 
 19.  See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2798 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (noting that the original draft of the RFRA in the Senate included the word 
“burden” unmodified and that the term “substantial” was added pursuant to a clarifying 
amendment). 
 20.  See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 244, 2 F.3d at 244 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[I]f the law’s 
requirements do not amount to a substantial burden under RFRA, that is the end of the 
matter.”). 
 21.  See Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 
38 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 35, 80 (2015) (arguing that “the test of substantial burden has two 
parts, not just one,” and that the conflict must involve “secular costs of compliance with faith” 
and “religious costs for those who comply with secular law.”).  
 22.  See Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 246. 
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compel an act that a religious adherent sincerely believes violates her religious 
principles. 23 
Complicity-based conscience claims are a means of establishing the “religious” 
burden of compliance with a law or regulation. For instance, in Hobby Lobby, the 
plaintiffs’ substantiality argument consisted of two basic claims: First, compliance 
with the ACA’s minimum coverage requirements would force them to “provid[e] 
insurance coverage for items that risk killing an embryo[, thereby] mak[ing] them 
complicit in abortion,”24 and second, noncompliance would trigger large fines.25 
Only by making both claims could the plaintiffs show that the law was sufficiently 
coercive with regards to their religious practices to trigger strict scrutiny analysis. 
In turn, a complicity-based conscience claim itself comprises three interrelated 
sub-claims: a moral claim, an empirical claim, and a relational claim.26 Consider 
again the plaintiffs’ claims in the Hobby Lobby decision:  
The owners of the businesses have religious objections to abortion, and 
according to their religious beliefs the four contraceptive methods at 
issue are abortifacients. If the owners comply with the HHS mandate, 
they believe27 . . . that [will connect them] to the destruction of an embryo 
in a way that is sufficient to make it immoral for them to provide the 
coverage.28  
The first proposition, a religious objection to abortion, amounts to a moral claim 
or “proposition[] about right and wrong.” 29 The second proposition, that the ACA 
coverage requirements include pharmaceuticals that may be categorized as 
abortifacients, is an empirical claim or assertion of testable fact.30 The final 
proposition, that compliance would facilitate abortion in some way sufficient to 
amount to sinful complicity, is a relational claim that proves the connection between 
the conduct of a third party and the plaintiffs’ religious convictions.31 
Argumentatively, each of these propositions is necessary to justify the claim that 
compliance would substantially burden religious practice. The first two propositions, 
moral and empirical, serve similar argumentative purposes; both are premises in that 
both are foundations for further reasoning rather than themselves being the product 
of the argument’s logic.32 These data points, however, do not obviously amount to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 23.  See Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151, 1209 
(10th Cir. 2015) (Baldock, J., dissenting). 
 24.  Brief for Respondents at 9, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 
(2014) (No. 13-354). 
 25. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775–76 (2014) (noting that 
the penalties facing plaintiffs for either failure to provide contraceptive care or failure to 
provide healthcare altogether would amount to “surely substantial” sums). 
 26.  Sepinwall, supra note 3, at 1912.  
 27.   134 S. Ct. at 2759.  
 28.  134 S. Ct. at 2778. 
 29.  Sepinwall, supra note 3, at 1912. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id.  
 32.  Using the terminology of argumentation scholar Stephen Toulmin, both can be 
categorized as “data” in support of the claim. See TOULMIN, supra note 12, at 90–91.  
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the claim; an additional logical “step” is necessary to connect these premises to the 
proposed conclusion.33 The relational claim represents this additional “step” in 
reasoning that links the allegedly sinful conduct of third parties to a claim of personal 
moral culpability.34 In this sense, the relational component of a complicity claim acts 
as a logical function; it authorizes an inference of complicity from a certain data set.35 
Bearing in mind this simple argumentative structure, a complicity claim may be 
tested for validity on two registers. First, one may dispute the validity of the 
premises: this criticism is effectively pre-argumentative in the sense that a problem 
with the validity of a premise does not suggest any flaw with the reasoning process 
but rather the inputs.36 In regards to moral propositions in the RFRA context, such 
challenges are broadly limited to testing the sincerity of the plaintiff’s religious 
convictions.37 Because the Judiciary is barred from considering the reasonableness 
of religious belief, moral propositions in RFRA claims are subject only to very 
deferential review.38 Empirical claims, on the other hand, should be afforded no such 
deference. Hobby Lobby largely bracketed any serious inquiry into the validity of the 
plaintiffs’ disputable claim that the contraceptive methods at issue could trigger 
abortions,39 but it defies reason to suggest that Congress intended the heavy burden 
of strict scrutiny review to adhere on the basis of plainly unfounded factual 
assertions.40  
Second, one may dispute an argument’s reasoning, which requires a more 
complex process of criticism.41 By excerpting an argument’s inferential reasoning 
from its premises, the underlying logic of an argument can be stated generically: 
given sufficient data of a certain type, a particular conclusion is sound.42 Parsed in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 33.  See id. 
 34.  If the Hobby Lobby plaintiffs’ only claim was amounted to a personal objection to 
use of abortifacients, then they would effectively admit that the employer mandate imposed 
no substantial burdens on their beliefs; the controversy in Hobby Lobby followed from an 
additional religious assertion claiming culpability for the acts of others. See EUGENE VOLOKH, 
SEBELIUS V. HOBBY LOBBY: CORPORATE RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES 48 (2014). 
 35.  In this sense, the relational claim operates within a complicity argument as what 
Toulmin termed a “warrant.” See TOULMIN, supra note 12, at 91.  
 36.  See id. at 90 (“[W]e may not get the challenger even to agree about the correctness 
of these facts, and in that case we have to clear his objection out of the way by a preliminary 
argument: only when his prior issue or ‘lemma’, [sic] as geometers would call it, has been 
dealt with, are we in a position to return to the original argument.”) 
 37.  See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774, 2778 (2014). 
 38.  Sepinwall, supra note 3, at 1927–29 (“[M]oral deference should be absolute, but it 
need not be enthusiastic . . . .”). 
 39.  See 134 S. Ct. at 2778 (declining to consider the plausibility of the religious claim). 
 40.  See Sepinwall, supra note 3, at 1932 (“Accepting all factual assertions as true no 
matter their plausibility would commit us to a life of irrationality.”); see also 139 CONG. REC. 
26,180 (1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“[RFRA] does not require the Government to justify 
every action that has some effect on religious exercise.”). 
 41.  See TOULMIN, supra note 12, at 90–91. 
 42.  See id. at 91 (“[Warrants] may normally be written very briefly (in the form ‘If D, 
then C’); but, for candour’s sake, they can profitably be expanded, and made more explicit: 
‘Data such as D entitle one to draw conclusions, or make claims, such as C,’ or alternatively 
‘Given data D, one may take it that C.’”). 
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this way, the soundness of an argument’s reasoning relies upon whatever assurances 
a speaker may provide to show that this function may generally authorize the 
underlying inferential step.43 The sort of assurances that are necessary to substantiate 
an inference varies according to the venue.44 For example, the evidence required to 
establish “causation” in epidemiology bears little resemblance to the same concept 
in a legal forum.45 
In the RFRA context, the relational element of a complicity claim represents a 
form of faith-based reasoning, so the assurances which underpin its internal logic are 
themselves religious. Consider, for instance, the Catholic concept of scandal: therein 
one may be culpable for the sins of others where one provides “material support” for 
the objectionable acts.46 A relational claim premised upon this moral precept would 
necessarily consist of two elements.47 The first component of the claim would 
comprise a set of religious criteria: Catholic moral reasoning provides that “scandal” 
may consist of “command, counsel, agreement, flattery, protection, participation, 
silence, not objecting, [or] not revealing.”48 These criteria define a “line” that 
demarks the degree of participation in sin that a Catholic adherent must not cross.49 
The second element amounts to a satisfaction claim: the argument must effectively 
assert that the data presented satisfies these religious criteria for complicity. For 
instance, a Catholic objection to the contraceptive-coverage mandate must allege that 
compliance “crosses the line” into scandalous participation in the contraceptive 
choices of others.50  Both of these components are, at root, dependent upon religious 
reasoning, so judicial inquiry may only scrutinize the relational element of a 
complicity claim to a limited degree.51  
Part II surveys the present array of judicial approaches to complicity claims in 
light of this argumentative scheme. Thereafter, in Part III, I attempt to distinguish 
                                                                                                                 
 
 43.  Id. at 95–96. 
 44.  Id. at 96. 
 45.  See generally Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort 
Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 732 (1984) (discussing application of epidemiological 
concepts of proof in the context of legal causation). 
 46.  Edward C. Lyons, Causation and Complicity: The HHS Contraceptive Mandate and 
Asymmetrical Burdens on Free Exercise, 55 S. TEX. L. REV. 229, 289 (2013) (“Catholic ethical 
theory takes this complexity of human interaction into account by means of a moral discussion 
it refers to under the rubric, ‘Formal and material cooperation in others’ wrongdoing.’”). 
 47.  See Sepinwall, supra note 3, at 1912 n.53. 
 48.  See Lyons, supra note 46, at 290 (quoting 2 ST. ALPHONSUS LIGOURI, THEOLOGIA 
MORALIS 357, 557 (L. Gaude ed.,1910)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 49. The Supreme Court often conceptualizes complicity-based claims in terms of 
metaphorical line-drawing: the religious adherent is entitled to draw a proverbial “line in the 
sand” regarding his/her participation in the sinful conduct of others. See Thomas v. Review 
Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 710 (1981); see also infra, note 88 and 
accompanying text. 
 50.  See Lyons, supra note 46, at 294 (discussing the structure of Catholic claims that 
compliance with the HHS contraceptive mandate could implicate formal or material 
cooperation in sin from the perspective of Catholic moral thought). 
 51.  See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714 (“[R]eligious beliefs need not to be acceptable, logical, 
consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.”). 
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judicial analyses that rely upon testing the soundness of religious reasoning and those 
that employ no such inquiry. 
II. TESTING COMPLICITY BASED RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CLAIMS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
ACA ACCOMMODATIONS 
In large part, the various controversies surrounding the ACA accommodation 
scheme for religious, non-profit employers have turned upon disputes regarding how 
the regulations “actually work.”52 Accordingly, some detailed exposition regarding 
the regulatory framework of the ACA is necessary in order to contextualize the 
various complicity tests that these controversies have spawned. Part II.A provides a 
brief history and explanation of the regulatory provisions that make up the 
accommodation scheme; thereafter, Part II.B surveys circuit court decisions that have 
considered the validity of these accommodations under the RFRA.  
A. The Structure of ACA Accommodations 
The ACA generally requires employers who employ at least fifty 
full-time-equivalent employees to provide health insurance that meets “minimum 
essential coverage” requirements.53 Failure to meet this requirement triggers various 
fines. If a covered employer supplies health insurance that does not meet the 
minimum essential coverage requirements, the employer may be required to pay one 
hundred dollars per day for each effected individual.54 Alternatively, if an employer 
fails to provide health insurance altogether, it runs the risk of being fined two 
thousand dollars per year for each of its full-time employees.55 
The essential minimum coverage standards include feminine health “preventative 
care and screenings” that may not be subject to “any cost sharing requirements.”56 
Congress did not define the precise services that must be included within insurance 
plans under this heading.57 Rather, the statute provides that group health plans must 
provide coverage according to the evidence-based recommendations of the U.S. 
Preventative Services Task Force as codified in comprehensive guidelines supported 
by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA).58 
After passage of the ACA, the HRSA developed recommendations regarding 
contraceptive care in conjunction with the Institute of Medicine.59 After an Institute 
of Medicine study revealed that women bear disproportionate burdens in attaining 
comprehensive health services and that excluding contraceptive care from the slate 
of preventative services available without cost sharing would lead to adverse health 
                                                                                                                 
 
 52.  See, e.g., Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422, 436 
(3rd Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Catholic Health Care Sys. v. Burwell, 796 
F.3d 207, 218 (2d Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2450 (2016). 
 53.  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f)(2) (2012); 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a), (c)(2) (2012). 
 54.  26 U.S.C. § 4980D(a)–(b) (2012). 
 55.  26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a), (c)(1) (2012). 
 56.  42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012). 
 57.  See id. § 300gg-13(a)(1)–(4).  
 58.  See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762 (2014). 
 59.  Id. at 2788 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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consequences, the HRSA adopted guidelines recommending coverage of all 
FDA-approved contraceptive methods and related patient education and counseling 
for all women with reproductive capacity.60 Following publication of this guideline, 
the regulatory agencies charged with enforcement of the ACA, including the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), promulgated regulations 
requiring health plans to incorporate the HSRA recommendation.61 
These regulations provide an exemption to the contraceptive coverage 
requirements for religious objectors.62 This accommodation is available to non-profit 
organizations that “hold [themselves] out as [] religious organizations” and “oppose[] 
providing coverage for some or all of any contraceptive items or services required to 
be covered . . . on account of religious objections.”63 In order to invoke the 
accommodation, an employer must self-certify that it meets these criteria.64 This 
self-certification may proceed in one of two ways. First, the employer may complete 
EBSA Form 700, issued by the Department of Labor’s Employee Benefit Security 
Administration.65 The form requires the name of the organization, the name and title 
of the person signing it, and contact information; by submitting the form, the 
signatory certifies that it meets the requirements and believes the form to be correct.66 
Alternatively, an employer can directly submit notice to HSS. The notice need not 
take any particular form, but it must include the name of the organization, a statement 
of religious opposition to the coverage mandate, and contact information for the plan 
insurer or third party administrator.67 
The effect of an employer’s self-certification depends upon its means of providing 
insurance to employees. For employers who provide coverage through a group health 
plan insurer, self-certification notifies the insurer of an obligation to “[e]xpressly 
exclude contraceptive coverage from the group health insurance coverage” provided 
by the employer and to “segregate premium revenue collected from the [employer] 
from the monies used to provide payments for contraceptive services.”68  
Importantly, self-certification does not create the obligation to provide contraceptive 
care because the statutory language obliges insurance issuers to ensure that plan 
participants receive contraceptive coverage, so the insurer would be obligated to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 60.  Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of 
Preventative Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 
8,725, 8,725–26 (Feb. 15, 2012). 
 61.  See 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713(a)(1)(iv) (2016); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713(a)(1)(iv) 
(2015); 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv) (2015). 
 62.  45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a) (2015). 
 63.  Id. at § 147.131(b). 
 64.  Id. at § 147.131(b)(3).  
 65.  29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713A(b)(1)(ii), (c)(1) (2015); 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c)(1) 
(2015). 
 66.  DEP’T OF LABOR, EBSA FORM 700 (2014), 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/preventiveserviceseligibleorganizationcertificationform.doc. 
 67.  See 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715–2713A(b)(1)(ii)(B), (c)(1)(ii); 45 C.F.R. § 
147.131(c)(1)(ii). This alternative self-certification process is the result of a Supreme Court 
injunction against the requirement that employers use an earlier version of EBSA Form 700. 
See Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell., 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2807 (2014). 
 68.  29 C.F.R. § 2590.715–2713A(c)(2)(i)(A)–(B) (2015); 45 C.F.R. § 
147.131(c)(2)(i)(A)–(B) (2015). 
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provide coverage regardless of whether the employer self-certifies.69 Alternatively, 
if an employer self-insures,70 self-certification authorizes HHS to designate the 
employer’s third party administrator (TPA) as a claims administrator for 
contraceptive benefits.71 After such designation, the TPA is eligible for 
reimbursement for contraceptive services it provides at a rate of 150%.72 In either 
case, a self-certifying organization is not required to “contract, arrange, pay, or refer 
for contraceptive coverage,”73 and insurers or TPAs must transmit all material and 
communication regarding the contraceptive care in a manner “separate from” 
material distributed on account of the employer’s health plan.74 
B. Alternative Approaches to Substantial Burden Analysis 
Despite these regulatory steps to insulate objecting employers from the provision 
of contraceptives, a number of non-profits have objected to this accommodation 
scheme on the theory that the self-certification process itself amounts to a substantial 
burden on religious exercise.75 In injunction proceedings, these cases have produced 
an inconsistent set of decisions regarding the propriety of the accommodation 
scheme given the requirements of RFRA.76  
With some minor variations, the plaintiffs’ core contentions in these cases are 
generally threefold. To illustrate, consider two cases: Eternal Word Television 
Network v. Secretary,77 in which the plaintiffs successfully attained an injunction, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 69.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-13, 300gg-22 (2012); see also Little Sisters of the Poor 
Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151, 1165 (10th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1557 
(2016). 
 70.  A self-insured employer assumes the risk of providing health benefits for its 
employees directly; in most cases, a self-insured employer contracts with a third party 
administrator to manage contracts with healthcare providers, administer coverage policies, and 
arrange payments. See Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, 794 F.3d at 1162–63. 
 71.  26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713A(b)(1)(ii)(B) (2015); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-
2713A(b)(1)(ii)(B). 
 72.  26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713A(b)(3); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713A(b)(3); 45 C.F.R. § 
156.50(d)(2)(ii)–(iii) (2015); see also E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 793 F.3d 449, 454 (5th 
Cir. 2015) (“Third-party administrators and insurers that pay for contraceptives in this 
circumstance are eligible for government reimbursement of 115% of their expenses.”), 
vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016). 
 73.  Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 8,456, 8,462 (Feb. 6, 2013).  
 74.  26 C.F.R. § 54.9815–2713A(d); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715–2713A(d); 45 C.F.R. § 
147.131(d) (2015). 
 75.  See supra, note 13 and accompanying text.  
 76.  Compare, e.g., Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(finding plaintiff unlikely to prevail on its claim that self-certification substantially burdens its 
religious exercise), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2007 (2016), with Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Health & Human Servs., 801 F.3d 927 (8th Cir. 2015) (issuing an injunction after finding 
the plaintiff’s RFRA challenge substantially likely to succeed on the merits), vacated, No. 15-
775, 2016 WL 2842448 (U.S. May 16, 2016). 
 77.  756 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2014). 
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and Grace Schools v. Burwell, 78 in which the government prevailed. First, plaintiffs 
typically argue that self-certification renders them complicit in the provision of 
contraceptives because their action causes insurers or TPAs to provide contraceptive 
coverage. Plaintiffs in Grace Schools contended that self-certification “renders them 
complicit in a grave moral wrong because the form has certain legal effects that 
facilitate the provision of the objectionable services.”79 Likewise, plaintiffs in 
Eternal Word Television claimed that their submission of Form 700 would “trigger” 
their TPA’s obligation to provide contraceptive services.80  
Second, plaintiffs typically argue that even after accommodation, they must 
participate to an objectionable degree in the insurer’s or TPA’s efforts to provide 
contraceptive care. In Grace Schools, the plaintiffs argued that compliance with the 
accommodation would require them to undertake various actions “in furtherance of” 
a scheme to provide objectionable services, including amending the documents 
governing their health program.81 Plaintiffs in Eternal Word Television likewise 
complained of the administrative burden of identifying the eligible employees so that 
the TPA could provide services.82 Finally, plaintiffs’ typically argue that the 
accommodation improperly utilizes their health plans as conduits to enable delivery 
of contraceptive services. The Grace Schools plaintiffs claimed that the 
accommodation required them to “contract with insurance companies or third-party 
administrators that are authorized to provide objectionable coverage.”83 Similarly, 
the Eternal Word Television plaintiffs complained that they would be required to 
locate an administrator who is willing to provide the services.84 
The plaintiffs’ inconsistent success raising these functionally identical claims 
reflects underlying disagreement as to the proper tests that courts ought to apply to 
gauge the substantiality of complicity-based religious burdens.85 In all, the judicial 
approaches to this question since Hobby Lobby can be categorized into three broad 
camps.  
First, a number of courts attempt to confine adjudication of a plaintiff’s claim of 
religious burden to a question of sincerity.86 These cases broadly rely upon the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 78.  801 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2011 (2016).  
 79.  Id. at 802. 
 80.  756 F.3d 1339, 1342 (11th Cir. 2014) (Pryor, J., concurring). 
 81.  801 F.3d at 803. 
 82.  756 F.3d at 1342 (Pryor, J., concurring). 
 83.  801 F.3d at 803. 
 84.  756 F.3d at 1342–43 (Pryor, J., concurring). 
 85.  Compare, e.g., Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 
1151, 1208 (10th Cir. 2015) (Baldock, J., dissenting) (“Several learned judges have argued 
compellingly that . . . the amount of coercion the government uses to force a religious adherent 
to perform an act she sincerely believes is inconsistent with her understanding of her religion’s 
requirements is the only consideration relevant to whether a burden is ‘substantial’ under 
RFRA.”), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016), with Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“Accepting the sincerity of Plaintiffs’ 
beliefs . . . does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to evaluate the substantiality of any 
burden on Plaintiffs’ religious exercise.”), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016).  
 86.  See, e.g., Dordt Coll. v. Burwell, 801 F.3d 946, 949 (8th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. 
Ct. 2006 (2016); Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 801 F.3d 
927, 935 (8th Cir. 2015), vacated, No. 15-775, 2016 WL 2842448 (U.S. May 16, 2016); Grace 
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Supreme Court’s guidance in Thomas as excerpted in Hobby Lobby.87 Thomas 
involved a religious pacifist working in a steel manufacturer; when he was reassigned 
to work on tank turret fabrication, he quit and applied for unemployment benefits.88 
The state unemployment authority denied his benefits because he quit by choice.89 
Despite factual disputes on the record concerning whether the plaintiff’s religion 
traditionally considered manufacture of war goods sinful,90 the Court held that a 
religious adherent is entitled to determine for himself whether a given degree of 
participation in the sins of others is acceptable, so a government benefit could not be 
conditioned upon the choice.91  
Taking this line of reasoning to its logical conclusion, a mere sincere belief that 
compliance with a law would violate religious convictions coupled with a sufficient 
sanction against noncompliance will invariably amount to a substantial burden. For 
example, in Eternal Word Television, the court found that plaintiffs’ naked assertion 
that compliance with the self-certification requirement would violate their religious 
belief, regardless of whether their understanding of “how the contraception mandate 
works” was reasonable, was sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny analysis.92 Similarly, 
the court in Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. Department of Health and Human Services 
phrased its approach entirely in terms of the plaintiffs’ beliefs: “if one sincerely 
believes that completing Form 700 or HHS Notice will result in conscience-violating 
consequences, what some might consider an otherwise neutral act is a burden too 
heavy to bear.”93 
Second, in stark contrast to the first approach, a majority of courts have adopted 
a test that concentrates intensely upon veracity of plaintiffs’ assertions regarding the 
function of the challenged regulations.94 These courts distinguish between plaintiffs’ 
beliefs concerning their own religious obligations and plaintiffs’ assertions regarding 
                                                                                                                 
 
Schools, 801 F.3d at 808 (Manion, J., dissenting); Eternal Word Television, 756 F.3d at 1340–
41 (Pryor, J., concurring).  
 87.  See, e.g., Sharpe Holdings, 801 F.3d at 941 (“It is not our role to second-guess 
[plaintiffs’] honest assessment of a ‘difficult and important question of religion and moral 
philosophy, namely, the circumstances under which it is wrong for a person to perform an act 
that is innocent in itself but that has the effect of enabling or facilitating the commission of an 
immoral act by another.’” (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 
2778 (2014))).  
 88.  Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 710 (1981). 
 89.  See id. 
 90.  See id. at 713–14. 
 91.  See id. at 715. 
 92.  Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 756 F.3d 1339, 1340 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 93.  Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 801 F.3d 927, 941 
(8th Cir. 2015), vacated, No. 15-775, 2016 WL 2842448 (U.S. May 16, 2016). 
 94.  See, e.g., Catholic Health Care Sys. v. Burwell, 796 F.3d 207, 218 (2d Cir. 2015), 
vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2450 (2016); Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 
F.3d 1151, 1177 (10th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. 
Burwell, 793 F.3d 449, 456 (5th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Univ. of Notre 
Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606, 612 (7th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2007 (2016); Priests 
for Life v. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated, 136 
S. Ct. 1557 (2016). 
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“how the law or policy being challenged actually operates and affects religious 
exercise.”95 The former concern is a question of fact wherein the court is confined to 
consider only the sincerity of plaintiffs assertions, but the latter concerns are 
questions of law that are within the court’s purview.96 By concentrating analysis on 
“what the law actually requires,”97 these courts effectively determine substantiality 
questions according to traditional legal considerations of causation.98  
The interplay between the majority and dissenting opinions in Little Sisters of the 
Poor Home for the Aged99 demonstrates the causality-type arguments common to 
these decisions. The majority found that neither the group health plan plaintiffs nor 
the self-insured plaintiffs demonstrated a substantial burden on their religious 
practices.100 Considering the group health plan plaintiffs, the court concluded that 
self-certification “does not enable coverage” because the “insurance issuer . . . has 
an independent and exclusive obligation to provide [contraceptive] coverage without 
cost sharing.”101 On this account, federal law would require insurers to provide 
coverage regardless of whether an employer utilized the accommodation, so any 
complicity argument arising from providing access to coverage must fail.102 
Regarding self-insured plaintiffs, the majority similarly denied a complicity claim on 
the basis that self-certification “does not change or expand contraceptive coverage 
beyond what federal law already guaranteed.”103 In the court’s reasoning, this 
conclusion follows because “federal law generally requires that all people must have 
health insurance . . . including contraceptive coverage,” so plan participants would 
be entitled to contraceptive coverage regardless of the employers’ utilizing the 
accommodation.104 On this account, plaintiffs’ complicity claim failed despite their 
showing that self-certification “is a but-for cause of the TPAs’ authority to provide 
contraceptive coverage.”105  
The dissent agreed with the court’s conclusion regarding the insured plaintiffs but 
reached the opposite conclusion regarding the self-insured plaintiffs.106 Because the 
plaintiffs’ claims were premised on a causal consideration, the dissent found a 
“critical distinction” between self-insured and group-health plans because “in the 
self-insured context, a TPA would be ‘authorized and obligated to provide coverage 
                                                                                                                 
 
 95.  Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged, 794 F.3d at 1177. 
 96.  See E. Tex. Baptist Univ., 793 F.3d at 456.  
 97.  Catholic Health Care Sys., 796 F.3d at 218 (quoting Priests for Life, 772 F.3d at 249) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 98.  For example, the court in East Texas Baptist University distinguished its approach 
from Hobby Lobby as follows: “The difference is not just that there are more links in the causal 
chain here than in Hobby Lobby—a difference that would not change the outcome, given that 
we accept an adherent's judgment as to how much separation is enough. It is also that the type 
of compelled act is quite different—the act at issue in this case is not one that authorizes or 
facilitates the use of contraceptives.” 793 F.3d at 462.  
 99.  794 F.3d 1151. 
 100.  See id. at 1181, 1183–86. 
 101.  See id. at 1181. 
 102.  See id. at 1182–83. 
 103.  See id. at 1186. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  See id. at 1185. 
 106.  Id. at 1209 (Baldock, J., dissenting). 
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. . .  only if the religious non-profit . . . opts out.’”107 In the dissent’s view, “this makes 
their opting out a but-for cause of the receipt of the coverage.”108 Accordingly, opting 
out makes plaintiffs complicit in the provision of contraception because their action 
triggers a regulatory process by which their employees’ gain access to coverage.109 
In this sense, the disjuncture between the majority and dissent turned upon the degree 
of dispositive weight the court ought to attribute to “but-for” causal analysis.110 
Finally, a third test disposes of substantiality considerations by distinguishing 
between allegations according to whether a regulation directly impinges upon 
religious exercise or merely affects plaintiffs’ clarity of religious conscience.111 
These cases rely upon a distinction between burdens on religious conduct and 
burdens on religious conscience or sentiment developed in Bowen v. Roy112 and Lyng 
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n.113  
With this distinction in mind, a number of courts have determined that religious 
objectors do not suffer substantial burdens under RFRA where the only harm is 
sincere unease with their inability to prevent others from fulfilling regulatory 
objectives after they opt out.114 Employers enjoy no RFRA right to be “free from the 
unease, or even anguish, of knowing that third parties are legally privileged or 
obligated to act in ways their religion abhors.”115 Consider the plaintiff’s claims in 
Geneva College v. Department of Health & Human Services.116 Therein, Geneva 
College admitted that, unlike directly paying for contraceptives, neither the provision 
of health insurance generally nor the administrative task of self-certifying, standing 
alone, would be objectionable; rather, the plaintiffs objected in light of the 
downstream activities of third parties reacting to its decision to opt out.117 On this 
basis, the court determined that the plaintiff’s claims did not amount to an objection 
                                                                                                                 
 
 107.  Id. at 1210 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
 108.  Id. at 1211 (Baldock, J., dissenting).  
 109.  See id. at 1213 (Baldock, J., dissenting) (“[F]ederal law, only in conjunction with the 
self-insured plaintiffs' opt out, allows plan participants and beneficiaries to receive 
contraceptive coverage.” (emphasis in original)). 
 110.  See id. at 1212 (Baldock, J., dissenting). 
 111.  See, e.g., Catholic Health Care Sys. v. Burwell, 796 F.3d 207, 223 (2d Cir. 2015), 
vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2450 (2016); E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 793 F.3d 449, 456 (5th Cir. 
2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606, 623 
(7th Cir. 2015) (Hamilton, J., concurring), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2007 (2016); Geneva Coll. v. 
Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422, 441 (3d Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 
S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 
246 (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016). 
 112.  476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986) (rejecting a free exercise challenge to the government’s use 
of a Native American child’s Social Security number for purposes of administering benefit 
programs because the government’s internal uses of that number ‘‘place[d] [no] restriction on 
what [the father] may believe or what he may do’’). 
 113.  485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988) (distinguishing plaintiffs’ free exercise right to avoid being 
coerced into violating religious beliefs and the right to pursue “spiritual fulfillment according 
to their own religious beliefs”). 
 114.  See Catholic Health Care Sys., 796 F.3d at 223. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  778 F.3d 422. 
 117.  See id. at 435. 
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regarding what the regulations required of it but rather an attempt to impose a 
“religious veto against plan providers' compliance with those regulations.”118 Stated 
simply, Geneva College stands for the proposition that a complicity-based 
conscience claim can only amount to a significant burden within the framework of 
RFRA where a plaintiff alleges that the actual requirements of the law require some 
degree of religiously forbidden participation in sin.  
Because these three tests produce inconsistent outcomes when applied to similar 
facts, they cannot easily coexist. Part III considers each of these tests in terms of the 
argumentative scheme established in Part I. In light of this analysis, only the third 
approach can consistently determine whether a regulation substantially burdens a 
person’s exercise of religion without engaging in an evaluation of that person’s 
religious beliefs.     
III. TOWARDS A NONRELIGIOUS TEST FOR SUBSTANTIALITY 
An appropriate test for substantiality under the RFRA must enable courts to 
successfully navigate between two broad, potentially conflicting congressional 
mandates. First, the debates surrounding the term “substantial” in the initial RFRA 
drafts indicate that Congress did not intend strict scrutiny to apply to all government 
programs that place an articulable burden on religious practice.119 Second, as 
subsequently amended, RFRA clearly forbids courts from engaging in substantiality 
analysis that directly considers the internal consistency of religious claims.120 This 
congressional guidance reifies longstanding First Amendment jurisprudence that 
limits judicial inquiry into the reasonableness of religious belief.121 In the foregoing 
survey of judicial approaches to the ACA accommodation scheme, only the third test 
(i.e., distinguishing burdens upon religious conduct from those upon moral 
sentiment) satisfies both of these criteria.  
Confining religious burden analysis to a factual inquiry regarding sincerity, as the 
first approach in Part II does, belies the requirement that RFRA protection only apply 
to substantial burdens because deference to mistaken empirical claims invites nearly 
limitless expansion of strict scrutiny analysis. As the argumentative scheme in Part I 
details, a complicity claim relies upon both moral and empirical premises.122 Under 
this approach, such distinctions are meaningless, and a plaintiff need only to show a 
sincere belief that compliance with a law entails certain religiously forbidden 
practices.123 The problem with such a test is that deference to empirical claims invites 
                                                                                                                 
 
 118.  Id. at 439. 
 119.  See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 120.  After amendments contained in the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act of 2000, RFRA applies to “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or 
central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2012). 
 121.  The narrow function of judicial inquiry is to determine “whether the plaintiffs’ 
asserted religious belief reflects ‘an honest conviction.’” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 
134 S. Ct. 2751, 2757 (2014) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 
U.S. 707, 716 (1981)). 
 122.  See supra Part I. 
 123.  Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 756 F.3d 1339, 1340 (11th Cir. 2014). 
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strict scrutiny analysis on the basis of patently absurd factual contentions.124 
Consider a slight alteration to the fact pattern in Thomas; suppose that the plaintiff 
was mistaken that the components on which he worked were destined for use in tank 
turrets.125 If, instead, the components were to be used exclusively in, say, toy tanks, 
should strict scrutiny still apply?126 It would seem that the basic policy rationale 
behind the Thomas test is inapposite in such a scenario because inquiry into the actual 
uses of components does not require the court to “undertake to dissect religious 
beliefs.”127 Indeed, Hobby Lobby does not directly suggest that courts ought to treat 
empirical claims deferentially; rather, the Court refused to consider arguments 
regarding the improbability of abortions resulting from the challenged contraceptive 
methods.128 These arguments can be distinguished from an outright argument that 
the challenged contraceptive methods cannot lead to the expulsion of fertilized 
zygotes. Arguments of the latter variety do not attempt to mitigate the plaintiffs’ 
empirical claims; rather, such a line of argument places the veracity of those claims 
in contention. In such situations, a court should not afford deference to plaintiffs’ 
empirical claims.  
Conversely, the second approach described in Part II deploys broad judicial 
consideration of the nexus between religious belief and regulatory mechanics. In this 
more searching review, it improperly invites inquiry into the reasonableness of 
religious belief because it substitutes legal considerations, such as causality, for 
metaphysical ones. At first, it may seem as though the judicial task of determining 
how regulations “actually work”129 amounts to a call to inspect the empirical 
elements of a complicity claim, but upon closer inspection, this analysis interrogates 
substantially broader questions. Whether compliance with the self-certification 
scheme actually triggers, facilitates, or enables contraceptive coverage cannot be 
tested empirically because these terms do not comprise empirical criteria.130 Rather, 
they amount to moral criteria operating within the larger framework of a complicity 
claim.131 In effect, the religious adherent has drawn a “line” stating that conduct 
which “triggers” sin amounts to complicity in sin; accordingly, the criteria for what 
amounts to a “trigger” are themselves religious considerations.132  
                                                                                                                 
 
 124.  See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 125.  See Priests for Life v. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 249 n.14 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016). 
 126.  See id. 
 127.  See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981). 
 128.  See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014). 
 129.  See supra note 94 and accompanying text.  
 130. Sepinwall, supra note 3, at 1974 (“[D]eference should be the default here, given that 
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 131.  See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 132.  See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
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The legal concept of causality, itself a metaphysical calculation, is a poor proxy 
for this religious reasoning.133 As the dissent in Grace Schools aptly opines, “[a] 
thorough examination reveals that the accommodation's tangled mess is hiding the 
fact that the extension cord gets its power from the nonprofits' health plans and must 
be plugged in before it will work.”134 Regardless of whether an employer utilizes 
self-insurance or a group health plan, neither a TPA nor an insurer would have any 
duty to provide contraceptive care to the employer’s workers if she chose not to 
provide insurance in the first place and accept the statutory fines.135 Accordingly, 
courts cannot deny a “but-for” relationship between an employer’s engaging with the 
ACA system and the provision of objectionable contraceptive care; instead, courts 
employing this test must resort to reasoning akin to proximate causation and claim 
that culpability should really adhere to actors at some other place in the causal 
chain.136 At base, this approach cannot be principally distinguished from the 
“attenuation” arguments that Hobby Lobby explicitly rejected as impermissibly 
premised on testing the reasonableness of religious belief.137 
In light of the failings of the other two approaches, a test that distinguishes 
between burdens on religious conduct and those on moral sentiment (i.e., the third 
substantiality test analyzed in Part II) offers a workable means of limiting the 
universe of potential RFRA claims without vetting their religious aspects. In contrast 
to the causality test, courts employing this approach need not consider the 
metaphysical question of whether a regulation actually requires activity amounting 
to complicity; rather, following the guidance of Bowen and Lyng, courts need only 
to consider whether the religious compliant is premised on a restriction of religious 
exercise or merely the conduct of third parties.138 This analysis suggests a usable 
bright line rule for substantiality in the context of complicity claims: even if a law 
interferes with private persons’ ability to pursue “spiritual fulfillment,”139 it is not a 
substantial burden so long as it does not affirmatively compel religious adherents to 
refrain from religiously motivated conduct or to undertake religiously objectionable 
conduct.140 On this basis, one may draw a principled distinction between Hobby 
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a person over religious objections, and what it permits or requires a third party to do.”), 
vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016). 
 139.  See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988). 
 140.  See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986) (finding the administrative requirement 
to provide a Social Security number not burdensome on religious faith because "[i]t may 
indeed confront some applicants for benefits with choices, but in no sense does it affirmatively 
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Lobby and Geneva College: in the former, the plaintiffs directly objected to the action 
required by law, paying for contraceptives,141 whereas in the latter, the plaintiffs 
objected only to the downstream activities of others while specifically admitting no 
objection to their own legally required role.142 The latter claim is not articulable under 
RFRA because it references only the plaintiffs’ inability to proceed with a clear 
conscience, not their ability to engage in religious conduct without significant 
burden.143  
This approach to complicity claims may be conceptualized using a two-step 
judicial inquiry. First, the court must determine whether the relational element of an 
adherent’s complicity claim is itself founded upon sincere religious belief. A 
complicity claim relies upon two separate moral objections: an objection to the 
conduct of the third party and a judgement that a certain degree of participation in 
the third party’s conduct is itself objectionable. In order to find a substantial burden 
on religious practice, a court must determine that both claims are sincerely held 
religious beliefs. Second, the court must determine whether the latter religious 
objection goes towards some affirmative conduct that compliance with the 
challenged law or regulation would actually require.  
In order to demonstrate a substantial burden on religious practice under this test, 
a complicity-based claim would need to withstand both inquiries. For instance, the 
Geneva College plaintiffs failed to assert an actionable RFRA claim with regard to 
the first inquiry. By conceding that “the mere act of completing the EBSA Form 700 
does not impose a burden on their religious exercise,” the plaintiffs admitted that 
their objection to the accommodation scheme was premised entirely on their moral 
objection to the conduct of third parties.144 In other words, the plaintiffs failed to 
allege a sincerely held religious belief that their conduct under the law would itself 
be sinful; rather, the plaintiffs’ claim amounted to a naked objection to the conduct 
of others. A failure with regards to the second inquiry would resemble the plaintiff’s 
argument in University of Notre Dame v. Burwell. Therein, the plaintiff sought to 
enjoin the government against forbidding it from barring its insurer’s providing 
contraceptive coverage.145 The court denied this relief because RFRA does not afford 
a religious objector, once relieved of the obligation to undertake objectionable 
conduct, the right to raise a religious complaint regarding whatever arrangements the 
                                                                                                                 
 
compel appellees, by threat of sanctions, to refrain from religiously motivated conduct or to 
engage in conduct that they find objectionable for religious reasons” (internal footnotes 
omitted)). 
 141.  See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 142.  See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 143.  “Religious objectors do not suffer substantial burdens under RFRA where the only 
harm to them is that they sincerely feel aggrieved by their inability to prevent what other 
people would do to fulfill regulatory objectives after they opt out. They have no RFRA right 
to be free from the unease, or even anguish, of knowing that third parties are legally privileged 
or obligated to act in ways their religion abhors.” Priests for Life v. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 246 (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016). 
 144.  Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422, 435 (3d 
Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016). 
 145.  Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606, 611 (7th Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. 
Ct. 2007 (2016). 
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government makes for a substitute.146 Under the second inquiry, a RFRA claimant 
may not wield a religious objection in order to “veto” the conduct of a third party; 
rather, a claimant may only object to what the law requires of her personally.147  
Importantly, neither of these inquiries requires judicial scrutiny regarding the 
reasonableness of a plaintiff’s moral judgments; rather, this test only requires that 
the plaintiff allege that whatever is required by law actually violates a sincerely held 
religious belief on account of, at least in part, her own conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
The survey of judicial approaches in this analysis reveals the complexity and 
contradictions that characterize the state of RFRA jurisprudence following Hobby 
Lobby and Zubik. The various circuit courts that considered complicity-based claims 
similar to those in Hobby Lobby articulated at least three separate, 
mutually-exclusive tests prior to the Supreme Court’s granting certiorari in Zubik. 
But, with an evenly divided court, Zubik failed to articulate a usable standard. 
Rather than clarifying the viability of complicity-based claims under the RFRA, 
Zubik disposed of the matter with instructions counseling a compromised solution to 
the plaintiffs’ religious objections. After oral argument, the Court directed the parties 
to prepare supplemental briefs addressing “whether contraceptive coverage could be 
provided to petitioners’ employees, through petitioners’ insurance companies 
without . . . notice from petitioners.”148 In effect, the Court queried the parties 
whether the government interest, cost-free provision of contraceptives, could be 
fulfilled without the self-certification process to which the plaintiffs object. The 
parties agreed that “such an option is feasible.”149 And, specifically, the plaintiffs 
clarified that “their religious exercise is not infringed where they ‘need to do nothing 
more than contract for a plan that does not include coverage for some or all forms of 
contraception.’”150 Because the parties agreed that an inoffensive alternative to the 
self-certification process was available, the Court remanded the matter with 
instructions to allow the parties “an opportunity to arrive at an approach going 
forward that accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while at the same time 
ensuring women covered by petitioners’ health plans ‘receive full and equal health 
coverage, including contraceptive coverage.’”151 
On the basis of this compromise solution, the confused and contradictory 
jurisprudence of the circuits analyzed within this Note persisted Zubik’s remand 
order. Explicitly, the Court “express[ed] no view on the merits of the cases” and, 
importantly, did not reach the question of whether plaintiffs’ “religious exercise has 
been substantially burdened.”152 Accordingly, although Zubik vacated the decisions 
                                                                                                                 
 
 146.  See id. at 623 (Hamilton, J., concurring). 
 147.  See Geneva Coll., 778 F.3d at 439. 
 148.  Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1559–60 (2016) (per curiam). 
 149.  Id. at 1560. 
 150.  Id. (quoting Supplemental Brief for Petitioners at 4, Zubik v. Burwell, No. 14-1418 
(U.S. May 16, 2016) (per curiam)). 
 151.  Id. (quoting Supplemental Brief for Respondents at 1, Zubik v. Burwell, No. 14-1418 
(U.S. May 16, 2016) (per curiam)). 
 152.  Id. 
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in East Texas Baptist University, Little Sisters of the Poor, Geneva College, and the 
other circuit court decisions considered therein, it did not preclude the lower courts, 
on remand, from “reach[ing] the same conclusion” in the questions presented.153 
Indeed, Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, both dissenters in Hobby Lobby,154 
explicitly joined per curiam order only on the understanding that the Court’s 
instructions should not be construed as “signals of where this Court stands” on the 
questions of complicity under RFRA.155 Without a conservative majority on the 
court, this language suggests that it remains unclear whether the complicity logic 
endorsed in Hobby Lobby will remain viable.   
The state of RFRA jurisprudence after Zubik, then, remains fluid and 
unpredictable. The parties’ compromise solution in the case effectively rendered the 
question of substantial burdens on religious exercise moot: the government admitted 
its willingness to remove the objectionable self-certification step from its process, 
and the plaintiffs claimed no religious objection to the government’s provision of 
contraceptive coverage without their having to self-certify. Whether the plaintiffs’ 
vociferous objections to self-certification demonstrated a substantial burden on their 
religious exercise within the meaning of RFRA remained unanswered. As such, the 
contradictory jurisprudence surrounding the question of complicity under RFRA 
remains unresolved. 
Moving forward, courts ought to recognize the sound distinction between burdens 
on religious conduct, which enjoys protection under RFRA, and mere religious 
sentiment. Such an approach would allow courts to clarify their consideration of 
complicity-based claims without delving into a forbidden analysis of the content of 
religious belief. This Note concludes that the deference that must be afforded to 
religious claims forecloses significant judicial inquiry into the nexus between 
regulatory mechanics and moral commitments, so Courts should instead delineate 
substantial and insubstantial burdens on religion under the act according to whether 
compliance actually burdens religious conduct or merely impinges upon religious 
conscience. This approach represents a first, tentative step into the complex field of 
complicity-based religious freedom litigation, but it would allow courts to clarify a 
coherent post-Hobby Lobby, post-Zubik jurisprudence. 
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